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Abstract In the face of water scarcity, growing water demands, population increase, eco-
system degradation, or climate change, transboundary watercourse states inevitably have 
to make difficult decisions on how finite quantities of water are distributed. Such waters, 
and their associated ecosystem services, offer multiple benefits. Valuation and bargaining 
can play a key role in the sharing of these ecosystems services and their associated benefits 
across sovereign borders. Ecosystem services in transboundary watercourses essentially 
constitute a portfolio of assets. While challenging, their commodification, which creates 
property rights, supports trading. Such trading offers a means by which to resolve con-
flicts over competing uses and allows states to optimise their ‘portfolios’. However, despite 
this potential, adoption of appropriate treaty frameworks that might facilitate a market-
based approach to the discovery and allocation of water-related ecosystem services at the 
transboundary level remains both a challenge and a topic worthy of further study. Drawing 
upon concepts in law and economics, this paper therefore seeks to advance the study of 
how treaty frameworks might be developed in a way that supports such a market-based 
approach to ecosystem services and transboundary waters.
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1 Introduction
Transboundary watercourses, and their associated ecosystem services, offer multiple ben-
efits. The disciplines of law and economics have advanced our understanding of how such 
benefits might be discovered and distributed among beneficiaries, including between states. 
In the law literature, there has been a concerted effort to analyse the normative content of 
rules and principles of international law on transboundary waters, ascertain their status as 
customary international law obligations, and identify areas where legal norms or treaty1 
arrangements might be strengthened (McCaffrey 2007; McIntyre 2007; Wouters 2011). 
Much of this literature has focused on the principle of equity, and its capacity to allocate 
benefits between states, as well as the procedural and institutional structures needed to 
implement any equitable arrangement (e.g. McIntyre 2017). In the economics literature, 
game theory has been advanced to explain why riparians may or may not cooperate over 
their transboundary waters (Barrett 1994; Rogers 1997). There have also been significant 
efforts to estimate the costs and benefits of transboundary water cooperation (Sadoff and 
Grey 2002; UNECE 2015) and to explore the potential role of markets at the transboundary 
level (Dinar and Wolf 1994; Fisher 1995; Zeitouni et al. 1994). While the aforementioned 
literature demonstrates that there is much to be gained by states cooperating over trans-
boundary waters, it should also be appreciated that such benefits are far from guaranteed. 
Particularly in power asymmetric settings, and where governance arrangements are weak, 
ensuring that benefits are equitably distributed between states, as well as their populations, 
remains a key challenge (Meijerink and Huitema 2014; Mirumachi 2015).
This paper aims to help address this key challenge through a combined study of law 
and economics. While there has been significant attention placed on transboundary water 
conflict or cooperation from the disciplines of law or economics, little of this work seems 
to rely on first principles of both law and economics. There is, however, a great potential 
to draw from the economic analysis of law, which entails the deployment of the tools of 
microeconomics to determine the effects of legal rules and their social desirability. The 
parties involved, such as consumers, producers, or arbitrageurs, optimising their respective 
objective functions, are assumed to behave rationally, and the social desirability of equi-
librium outcomes is examined under the framework of welfare economics. In other words, 
the study of law and economics seeks to establish not only the effects of legal rules on the 
optimising behaviour of parties, but also the implications for societal well-being.
Not much research in law has drawn on economics to explain the correlation between 
treaty design, normativity, and compliance. From an economics perspective, Dombrosky 
(2007) applies different economic methods to analyse transboundary water ‘institutions’, 
which are broadly defined, and treaty design is only covered partially (see also Dinar 2008; 
Schmeier 2013). Makridis (2013) attempts to explore the role of markets within a trans-
boundary water context, but recognises that, ‘… many of the advances in industrial organi-
sation and applied microeconomics have not yet been integrated into the literature on trans-
boundary governance and sustainability’. Makridis (2013) goes on to suggest that, ‘there 
1 For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘treaty’ will be defined as, ‘an international agreement concluded 
between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument 
or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation’ (1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties). Conventions, agreements, and other legal instruments may therefore fall under the 
definition of a treaty if it can be demonstrated that those adopting them intended them to be governed by 
international law.
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is sparse literature that applies market design elements of incentive compatibility among 
heterogeneous actors in the context of transboundary water governance’.
Through its endeavour to combine the study of law and economics, and to build upon 
the existing literature, this paper seeks to make the following contributions. Firstly, the 
paper seeks to revisit the study of market-based approaches within the context of trans-
boundary cooperation. While such a study is not novel in itself, it contribution is to draw 
together a series of economic approaches and developments in a novel way, namely the 
notion of property rights and contracts, ecosystem services, valuation and natural capital, 
commodity trading, and portfolio optimisation. Secondly, the paper seeks to characterise, 
in the context of a transboundary watercourse, key considerations within treaty regime 
design that might help foster a market-based approach to transboundary cooperation. Addi-
tionally, the paper will consider both the constraints precluding states from securing those 
preferable treaty arrangements, and incentives that might be put in place to tackle them. 
Thirdly, the paper explores the advances in knowledge and understanding of the concept of 
ecosystem services and considers that knowledge and understanding within a transbound-
ary water context. While there has been a significant amount of work related to ecosystem 
services and water, little of that work has considered the transboundary nature of rivers, 
lakes, and aquifers (Rieu-Clarke and Spray 2013).
Ultimately, the paper advances the notion that ecosystem services in transboundary 
watercourses essentially constitute a portfolio of assets and that their commodification, cre-
ating property rights, supports market exchange or trading. In so doing, the paper explores 
the risks and opportunities associated with incorporating ecosystem services into a system 
of portfolio optimisation and commodity trading at the transboundary level.
2  Property rights and contracts as fundamental building blocks
One of the building blocks of a market approach to the allocation of ecosystem services 
among riparian states is the concept of property rights. Property law creates a bundle of 
rights which property owners are free to exercise and which protect them from interfer-
ence, and, while subject to transaction costs, voluntary exchange allocates property to 
those who value it most (Cooter and Ulen 2014). Elaborating on the canonical 1960 arti-
cle ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ by Ronald Coase, Libecap (2016) demonstrates in detail 
that, if property rights are not defined, the number of claimants could be unlimited, rents 
dissipated, and trade becomes impossible. The greater the benefits from establishing prop-
erty rights or the greater the losses from their absence, the higher the transaction costs. 
Moreover, the more stationary, observable, or smaller the resource, or the more stable its 
quality distributions, the lower the costs of measurement, enforcement, or exchange. This 
is why land or its associated environmental resources have tremendous potential for Coa-
sean trade. And the more homogeneous the parties, the more frequently they communicate, 
or the more similar their objectives for conservation or protection, the lower the costs of 
assigning property rights.
In the context of natural capital, however, the assignment of property rights may not 
always be feasible, or their exercise may not always be beneficial. Libecap (2016) asserts 
that the transaction costs of Coasean exchange tend to be high for ‘very broad-scale 
environmental externalities’. Given that mitigation values or costs vary within or across 
countries, long-term benefits or costs are different or uncertain under international envi-
ronmental agreements. As a result, international environmental agreements protecting 
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highly migratory ocean fish stocks or reducing greenhouse gas emissions, for example, are 
extremely elusive. Turner (2015) even maintains that the exercise of property rights could 
damage ecosystem services. For example, the laws of many countries provide landowners 
with a high degree of autonomy over their land-use practices, which can lead to unsustain-
able practices (Turner 2015). In the context of transboundary waters, whether or not the 
assignment or exercise of property rights is feasible or beneficial is likely in part to be a 
function of the cooperative arrangements that are, or are not, in place (Dombrowsky 2007). 
Such arrangements, as discussed below, have the potential to limit transactions costs.
Closely associated with property rights is the role of contracts. The economic analysis 
of contracts has a long tradition. Cooter and Ulen (2014) explain that a perfect contract is 
efficient and complete. If it is impossible to revise a contract in order to make at least one 
party better off and other parties not worse off, then the contract is Pareto efficient. Under a 
perfect contract, the terms have exhausted the possibilities for cooperation, the obligations 
of parties under every possible future state of the world are specified, and no potential gain 
for trade is left unrealised. Given that all contingencies have been anticipated under a com-
plete contract, re-negotiation is inefficient (Salanié 1999).
However, it is obvious that few markets achieve the ideal of perfect competition. Vari-
ous market failures, such as irrationality, coercion, externalities, lack of information, high 
transaction costs, or maker power, may lead to an imperfect contract (Cooter and Ulen 
2014). In the likely event of contract imperfection, institutions can play a role in making 
the contract as perfect or complete as possible (Cooter and Ulen 2014). Almost every con-
tractual dispute before the courts concerns the incompleteness of, or imperfections in, a 
contractual arrangement (Hart 1989).
A treaty regime for transboundary waters, which could be seen as a contractual arrange-
ment between states, is likewise unlikely to be perfect or complete. The aforementioned 
market failures that lead to an imperfect contract are also likely to be evident in a trans-
boundary water treaty setting. For example, there is often a lack of information on the 
dynamic uses of the waters of a transboundary rivers, lakes, or aquifers, especially in the 
light of climate variability; power asymmetries between upstream and downstream states 
may lead to coercion; externalities, such as transboundary pollution, may go unchecked; 
or the transaction costs of agreeing a transboundary treaty arrangement, and then seek-
ing to ‘perfect’ it, may be extremely high. Examples of ‘imperfect’ treaty arrangements 
abound, especially where power asymmetries are evident (see generally Zeitoun and Miru-
machi 2008). For instance, the high transaction costs in reaching a basin-wide agreement 
on the Nile have been well documented (Brunnée and Toope 2002; Salman 2012). Another 
example is how lack of information poses a key challenge in the debates over the develop-
ment of hydropower projects on the mainstream of the Mekong and the application of the 
1995 Mekong Agreement (Rieu-Clarke 2015). This has resulted in Cambodia, Vietnam, 
and Thailand all calling for a 10-year moratorium on hydropower development in the lower 
Mekong in order to establish baseline assessments of the River’s ecosystem and to better 
understand the impacts of those potential developments (Orr et al. 2012).
The adoption of an ‘imperfect treaty’ may, however, be justified if, due to bounded 
rationality, the cost of accounting for improbable contingencies outweighs the benefits 
of writing specific provisions (Salanié 1999). In such a scenario, certain strategies can be 
adopted in order to ‘perfect’ the treaty. For instance, increasing precision or reducing ambi-
guity in treaty terms supports the effort of perfecting or completing a treaty. Precision, 
measuring how the agreement clearly and unambiguously defines what is required for com-
pliance, not only increases the probability of detection, but also facilitates the resolution 
of conflicts of interpretation and the application of sanctions (Hafner-Burton et al. 2012). 
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Ambiguity or a lack of ‘textual determinacy’ is one of the main causes of poor treaty com-
pliance (Fuller 1964; Franck 1998). If the stakes are high or the parties are extremely risk 
averse, concerns about mistaken signals or imperfect enforcement lead to the avoidance of 
vague agreements (Sand 1992). However, defining precise rights and obligations for com-
plex problems at the outset may prove elusive (Franck 1998). Incomplete contracts may 
therefore be unavoidable when interests diverge or uncertainty is high (Hafner-Burton et al. 
2012). Countries may put different weights on economic or environmental factors. A uni-
fied weight satisfying all parties may be difficult to achieve (Zhua and Li 2014). In such 
cases, institutions designed to address ambiguities, and methodologies by which to ascer-
tain and harmonise values, become critical.
The use of money damages, as in the case of private contracts, may offer an additional 
means by which to enhance the prospects of treaty compliance (Guzman 2005). Cooter and 
Ulen (2014) explain that there are situations in which breach is more efficient than perfor-
mance and that expectations damages can restore the position of a breach victim as if the 
other party had performed. It is possible, but rare, to have provisions for money damages 
in international agreements. A state violating an international commitment suffers a loss of 
reputation and perhaps a direct sanction, but sanctions, which bring a loss to the violator 
without an offsetting gain to the victim, represent a net loss to all parties. If it were possible 
to establish damages in the form of a zero-sum transfer from one party to another, more 
efficient forms of cooperation could be encouraged. In other words, while maintaining the 
reputational or direct sanctions, transfers enhance compliance with international agree-
ments without adding to the disincentives arising from existing sanctions, especially if the 
damage is largely economic. Indeed, Cooter and Ulen (2014) confirm that, under contract 
law, if payoffs could be changed, games with inefficient solutions can indeed be converted 
into games with efficient solutions and that changing payoffs could occur through side 
payments. As noted above, an effective system of valuation becomes critical to the effec-
tiveness of any compliance method based on monetary damages. Valuation will therefore 
be considered in the following section, followed by an analysis of legal and institutional 
arrangements.
3  Can ecosystem services, portfolio optimisation, and commodity trading 
foster transboundary water cooperation?
Commodity trading is the business of transforming commodities in time (storage), space 
(logistics), or form (processing) (Pirrong 2014). Value is created through the optimisation 
of commodity transformations along a chain of commercial activities (Pirrong (2014). It 
is typical for an investor to select asset classes, prepare estimates of returns and their vari-
ability, and identify alternative allocations corresponding to different levels of risk toler-
ance (Sharpe 2007). It is also typical for a commodity trader to buy or sell across different 
grades, volumes, pricing structures, transaction or delivery dates, or transaction or delivery 
locations (Schofield 2007).
The application of portfolio management principles beyond the commercial sector has 
proven to be a useful tool by which to analyse the behaviour of different entities. For exam-
ple, Bertelli and John (2013) study the behaviour of democratic governments managing 
a portfolio of policy priorities for the public. Riparian states can be viewed as seeking to 
optimise the value of their portfolio of ‘transboundary watercourse assets’. A riparian, 
pondering how best to benefit from a transboundary watercourse, works with an initial 
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portfolio of watercourse assets, determines their valuations, considers candidate allocations 
consistent with its risk profile, and adjusts, through trading, the components of its portfo-
lio. Subject to a riparian’s risk appetite, watercourse assets can be commoditised and traded 
in order to capture their value. Designed and implemented properly, this approach reduces 
the imprecision or ambiguity of treaty regimes. However, adopting an asset management 
approach to transboundary waters is not without its challenges, which relate mainly to the 
nature of watercourse assets, difficulties in their valuation, and issues of risk mitigation and 
perception.
3.1  Nature of transboundary watercourse assets
A commodity is itself consumed, as opposed to, for example, a security in stock markets 
(Pirrong 2014). Just as energy commodities, such as gasoline, natural gas, or electricity, 
are consumed for the services they provide, including mobility, space or water heating, or 
lighting (Sweeney 2001), the services from (transboundary) watercourse assets can be con-
sumed. Significant advances in environmental economics over recent decades can assist in 
helping to view transboundary watercourses as assets.
An ecosystem, such as a rainforest, desert, or coral reef, is a collection of plants, ani-
mals, or micro-organisms interacting not only with each other but also with their non-liv-
ing environment. Such ecosystems provide significant ‘natural capital’—a term that has 
become well established in environmental economics and is gaining increasing policy rel-
evance (EC 2013; Jansson et  al. 1994). Inherent in the concept of natural capital is the 
notion of ‘assets which yield the goods and services that humans produce and/or use’ (UK 
National Ecosystem Assessment 2014). In other words, the services derived from those 
ecosystems are benefits which humans obtain from nature and can be viewed as assets 
(Ranganathan et al. 2008). Such assets can encompass a wider set of services offered by 
freshwater ecosystems (Alward et al. 2005; Grizzetti et al. 2016; see Table).
Alward et al. (2005)
Provisioning services Regulatory services Cultural services
Water (quantity and quality) for con-
sumptive use (for drinking, domestic 
use, and agriculture and industrial 
use)
Maintenance of water quality (natural 
filtration and water treatment)
Recreation (river raft-
ing, kayaking hiking, 
and fishing as a sport)
Water for non-consumptive use (for 
generating power and transport/
navigation)
Buffering of flood flows, erosion con-
trol through water/land interactions 
and flood control infrastructure
Tourism (river viewing)
Aquatic organisms for food and 
medicines
Existence values 
(personal satisfaction 
from free-flowing 
rivers)
Supporting services
Role in nutrient cycling (role in mainte-
nance of floodplain fertility), primary 
production
Predator/prey relationships and ecosys-
tem resilience
Significant progress has been made in understanding ecosystems and their services 
as natural capital or assets, particularly since the adoption of the Millennium Ecosystem 
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Assessment in 2005 (Hassan et al. 2005; TEEB 2010; Burkhard et al. 2013; Smith et al. 
2017; Willemen et al. 2014). However, there has been little work that has considered the 
transboundary nature of many river basins (Rieu-Clarke and Spray 2013). This is a huge 
gap in the literature. Transboundary river basins cover nearly half of the Earth’s land 
surface and account for 60% of global freshwater flow (UNEP-DHI and UNEP 2016).
An analysis of ecosystem services within a transboundary context can build upon 
scholarship that has sought to ascertain the benefits of cooperation over transbound-
ary waters. Sadoff and Grey (2002), for instance, identify four types of benefits from 
cooperation: better management of ecosystems (benefits to the river), increased food 
or energy production (benefits from the river), reduced tensions among riparians (cost 
reduction because of the river), and greater cooperation between states (benefits beyond 
the river) (see also Hensengerth et al. 2012). Furthermore, considering these services as 
assets provides opportunities for trade across borders and therefore portfolio optimisa-
tion (see discussion below).
When considering the nature of transboundary watercourse as assets, the concept of 
storability is particularly relevant. Pirrong (2014) provides a detailed discussion of the cru-
cial role of storability in commodity consumption or production decisions. Most commodi-
ties are storable. Some storable commodities are continuously produced and consumed, but 
others, although continuously produced, have seasonality in consumption. In the context of 
ecosystem services, natural or artificial storage is crucial to water resources management. 
The productivity of rain-fed agricultural systems, for example, tends to be highly variable 
due to fickle rainfall, and such systems are also often vulnerable to floods or droughts (Sal-
man and Martinez 2015). Forest ecosystems, often acting as sponges, intercept rainfall and 
absorb water through their root systems (Turner 2015). Water is then slowly released into 
surface water and groundwater. Forest ecosystems therefore play a key role in recharging 
groundwater supplies, regulating stream flows, and lowering peak flows during times of 
heavy rainfall and flooding. Low water storage per capita, as witnessed in many parts of 
Africa, is seen as an obstacle to agriculture or energy generation (Salman and Martinez 
2015). The concept of storability raises a number of issues when considering transbound-
ary watercourse assets. Dams provide a means by which to artificially store water. One 
example where states cooperate over water storage is the arrangement between Canada and 
the USA under the 1964 Columbia River Treaty. In that instance, Canada committed to 
build three large storage dams, Duncan, Keenleyside, and Mica, not only for flood pro-
tection in the USA but also for power generation in both Canada and the USA (Hensen-
gerth et al. 2012). Given that an upstream state’s decisions on water storage or release may 
have positive or negative effects on a downstream state, a transboundary approach to dam 
site selection and regulation is critical. Cooperation between states, such as in the case 
of Canada and the USA, potentially increases the return on investment if storage volumes 
and river heads are high (Hensengerth et al. 2012). In other instances, where the irrigation 
potential is upstream of the hydropower potential, trade-offs between energy generation 
and irrigation potential may have to be made (Salman and Martinez 2015). However, trans-
boundary basin planning requires significant levels of trust between states. Such trust may 
derive from a history of cooperation, such as the case of USA and Canada. In other basins, 
a lack of trust may make cooperation harder to achieve. Where there are low levels of trust, 
third parties can play an important role in fostering cooperation. This can in the case of 
the World Bank and the adoption of the 1960 Indus Treaty between India and Pakistan 
(Zawahri 2019). The Indus case also demonstrates the importance of effective legal and 
institutional arrangements, which if designed appropriately can offer certainty in scenarios 
where there are low levels of trust between states (see discussion below).
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3.2  The valuation of transboundary watercourse assets
A major challenge in applying market-based approaches within a transboundary con-
text relates to valuation. The UK National Ecosystem Assessment (2014) maintains that 
although nature, its biodiversity, or its ecosystems are crucial to human prosperity, they 
are ‘… consistently undervalued in conventional economic analyses and decision-making’. 
Two reasons for the tendency to undervalue ecosystems are a lack of data and informa-
tion and deficiencies in existing valuation methodologies. In the UK, for example, there 
is no comprehensive analysis of the contribution of ecosystem services to the economy 
(UK National Ecosystem Assessment 2014). This is not just a challenge for the UK, but 
worldwide (TEEB 2010). Typically, environmental or social costs are not fully expressed 
in terms of market prices because their monetisation can be methodologically complex, 
time-consuming, or costly, and the implications for compensation much disputed (Hensen-
gerth et  al. 2012). The non-financial nature of many water-related ecosystem benefits, 
together with inadequate estimates of their economic value, may cause them to be ignored 
(Schaafsma et al. 2015; Wam et al. 2016).
A key consideration in valuation methodologies is therefore how to deal with incom-
plete or missing markets. Varian (2010) describes the link between missing markets and 
negative externalities. If a transaction imposes a cost on a third party, the failure to account 
for the negative externality could lead to an inefficient outcome. In the case of pollution, 
there is a missing market, the market for the pollutant, and the polluter, in effect, faces a 
zero price for it. Libecap (2016) expounds on missing environmental markets. In princi-
ple, if property rights are defined, then traders are identified and addressing externalities 
through market exchange, or trading, becomes feasible. Property rights assign the benefits 
and costs to rights holders and provide incentives for conservation or investment. The fun-
damental approach to environmental valuation, Perman et al. (2011) narrates, is the ‘com-
modification’ of ecosystem services. Ecosystem services consumed by households and 
firms enter as arguments in utility and production functions, respectively, and the tools of 
consumer and producer theory are then used to estimate their monetary values (Perman 
et al. 2011).
In this regard, payment for ecosystem services (‘PES’) schemes have been widely con-
sidered in both developed and developing countries as a means by which to ‘commod-
ify’ ecosystem services (Martin-Ortega et al. 2015). These schemes constitute a means by 
which to reward ecosystem managers for maintaining or enhancing services which benefi-
ciaries value. Their implementation, however, can be problematic (Reid and Nsoh 2016; 
Schomers and Matzdorf 2013). Leisher (2015) demonstrates why such schemes are often 
problematic within the context of river basin management. She suggests that when com-
modity prices change, there is often a temptation by PES scheme members to withdraw 
large areas of land or deploy land-use practices which are detrimental to clean water provi-
sioning. For instance, payments received for livestock not grazing on certain land may be 
rendered insufficient given an increase in the price of milk or beef. This in turn may lead to 
the spoilage of ecosystem services provided by other participants.
In other words, the conceptual or practical difficulties related to payments for ecosys-
tem services tend to arise from incomplete or missing markets or poorly defined property 
rights. In the example above, a change in milk or beef prices shifts the opportunity cost 
of agricultural land, and there is a need to reorganise farm operations, including grazing 
activities, substitutes for which could be found elsewhere or at another time. In the absence 
of property rights and the signals they provide, however, it would be difficult to curtail 
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harmful land-use practices. Expanding the range of ecosystem services for valuation thus 
requires not only the identification of ‘pain points’, signalling enormous value, such as con-
gestion preventing the delivery of a commodity to where or when it is needed, but also the 
addition to the portfolio of new commodities representing them.
In the field of finance, Blanchett and Straehl (2015) study the implications of adding 
human capital, housing wealth, and pensions, all of which tend to be excluded in the tra-
ditional analysis, to a retirement portfolio. In estimating the value of human capital, earn-
ings are viewed as a dividend from the worker’s total human capital, and the return on 
human capital is estimated as the change in the total value of human capital over time. 
Similarly, in the context of ecosystem services, finding the value proposition which brings 
‘new’ products to the portfolio is the starting point. Houdet et al. (2015) contend that ‘[m]
onetary incentives (e.g. direct payments, premiums and state subsidies) and disincentives 
(e.g. environmental taxes, charges and penalties) can provide tangible reasons for corporate 
behaviour changes towards mainstreaming water ecosystem services stewardship in the pri-
vate sector … provided they are significant enough when compared to alternative undesir-
able behaviours and the associated costs and income streams’. In short, it is value, either 
received or foregone, which propels a product to be incorporated into mainstream decisions 
on consumption or production across locations, over time periods, or in form.
There are, of course, other types of valuations. The UK National Ecosystem Assessment 
(2014) shows that there are monetary and non-monetary values of cultural ecosystem ser-
vices. In principle, if cost or benefit streams cannot easily be quantified, one alternative is 
to describe them in qualitative terms (Hensengerth et al. 2012). Moreover, multiple values 
at individual, community, or societal levels have to be considered alongside the economic 
analysis (UK National Ecosystem Assessment 2014). This requires effective systems to be 
in place to link non-state actors, i.e. individuals and communities, to decision-making pro-
cesses that within a transboundary context are more often than not state-centric (see dis-
cussion below). The aggregation of different types of values, perceptions of them, and the 
ecosystem services they mainstream are crucial in the negotiation and design of coopera-
tive arrangements. Shared values across groups, communities, or society, in both monetary 
and non-monetary terms, tend to differ from those arising from conventionally aggregated 
individual values (UK National Ecosystem Assessment 2014). Riparians have to perceive 
that a project is not only at least acceptable but also better than doing nothing or acting uni-
laterally (Hensengerth et al. 2012). They have an incentive to cooperate not only if the net 
benefits of cooperation are at least comparable to those accruing in its absence, but also if 
the distribution of benefits is perceived to be fair (Sadoff and Grey 2002).
3.3  Transboundary watercourses assets and risk mitigation
A further key area to address when considering transboundary watercourses as assets 
is risk mitigation. The fundamental principles of risk, uncertainty, or preferences will 
influence both the design and operation of any transboundary watercourse asset system. 
LeRoy and Singell (1987), elaborating on the canonical 1921 work of Frank Knight, 
review the underlying logic of risk and uncertainty. Risks are insurable hazards, but 
uncertainty pertains to uninsurable hazards. Under moral hazard, it is impossible to 
insure the outcome of entrepreneurship without inadvertently distorting the entrepre-
neur’s incentives. Under adverse selection, it is impossible to exclude entrepreneurial 
“lemons”, whose presence would raise the insurance premium to the point at which 
successful entrepreneurs would drop out. In other words, insurance markets collapse 
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because of moral hazard or adverse selection, and the key distinction between risk and 
uncertainty pertains to the presence or absence of markets.
Calling for prudent risk management and an adaptive approach, the UK National 
Ecosystem Assessment (2014) asserts that, given the ‘scientific uncertainty’ regarding 
the adverse effects of human development on ecosystems and their services, it makes 
sense to be cautious: ‘[w]e cannot wait for more complete information as this may 
result in services being further degraded’. Decisions should be made within a risk-based 
framework, emphasising flexibility and ‘learning by doing’ (UK National Ecosystem 
Assessment 2014). Depending on the extent of flexibility or the pace of learning, it 
seems practical to ask whether or not an ecosystem could be allowed to ‘fail’ in the 
same way as a business might. Consider the PES schemes mentioned above. Is it pos-
sible to insure the outcome of ecosystem management without inadvertently distorting 
the ecosystem manager’s incentives? An arbitrary level of payment, completely unre-
lated to the expected damage, could lead to over- or under-compensation. Is it possi-
ble to exclude ‘lazy’ ecosystem managers and offer payments only to industrious ones? 
The presence of ‘lazy’ ecosystem managers could raise the overall cost of the payment 
scheme or discourage industrious ones from participation. Is it possible to have an eco-
system service which is systematically important? Saving one or another ecosystem ser-
vice from failure regardless of the ecological circumstances brings up the twin issues of 
perverse mechanisms or the design of efficient payment schemes.
The problem of missing markets is at the heart of risk management. Willems and 
Morbee (2010) analyse the missing markets problem and risk management. Markets are 
incomplete if perfect risk transfer is impossible, due perhaps to an insufficient set of hedge 
products. Not all potential gains from trade are exhausted in an incomplete market, and 
total welfare can be improved if a sufficient number of markets are added. In the context 
of ecosystem services, schemes seeking to replicate or recover the portfolio in case of a 
‘bad’ event are essentially hedge products. Capon and Bunn (2015) provide several exam-
ples. Given the risks posed by climate change to the future provision of water ecosystem 
services, options for supply-side adaptation seek to secure their protection, restoration, 
enhancement, or replacement. If climate change risks exceed the capacity of networks to 
protect water ecosystem services, new reserves may be located in areas expected to be 
highly valuable in the future. Protecting stream flows from water extraction after long peri-
ods of drought introduces temporal and spatial flexibility into threat management strate-
gies. It is practical to ask whether or not there is adequate liquidity or price discovery in the 
market for hedges. How likely would hedge markets collapse if the risks posed by climate 
change are not articulated at a level sufficiently granular for their valuation? A wide scope, 
and thus a potentially high cost, of supply-side adaptations to protect, restore, enhance, 
or replace water ecosystem services may require an exceedingly sophisticated market for 
hedging. How likely would a weather derivative, having a post-drought stream flow for its 
underlying commodity, achieve a perfect transfer of risk? Huge unknowns in the temporal 
or spatial behaviour of fluvial systems after a severe dry spell could raise hedge premiums 
or cause a misalignment between contracted protection and actual damage.
The concept of preferences is closely associated with the concepts of risk and uncer-
tainty. A systematic approach to risk management, Lo (1999) explains, consists of price 
(how much to pay for hedging risk), probability (how to assess the likelihood of risk), 
and preference (how much risk to bear and how much to hedge). Interestingly, Lo (1999) 
asserts that, of the three, preference is likely the most important but the least understood. 
Coleman (2011) extensively analyses the crucial role of risk preferences. He asserts that, 
‘[p]references are difficult to measure and vary from one investor to another’, and whether 
The role of valuation and bargaining in optimising transboundary…
1 3
or not a distribution is risky depends on the particular investor’s preferences. There is no 
unique ‘risk ranking’ for all distributions or all investors.
In the context of transboundary watercourse asset management, riparians are likely 
to have different preferences, and the diversity of their preferences is necessary to pro-
duce a ranking of distributions. The risk mapping between ecosystem services and soci-
etal preferences for them requires close scrutiny. Although human well-being depends on 
biophysical underpinnings and society must conserve and protect aquatic natural capital, 
water policy should aim for ‘… good ecological status within the context of societal prefer-
ences for the water environment’ (Blackstock et al. 2015). For cultural ecosystem services, 
additional research is needed to comprehend the preferences of diverse socio-economic or 
demographic groups (Church et  al. 2015). Moreover, riparians, as discussed above, may 
apply different weights on various economic or environmental factors, which are obviously 
dynamic, and their perceptions of acceptability, benefits, or fairness are central not only to 
the valuation process but also to a shared characterisation of risk. The provision of eco-
system services may be ‘vulnerable to regime shifts’, and, if such a shift occurs, sizeable 
harms may be irrevocable or difficult to repair (Schaafsma et  al. 2015). Indeed, ‘… the 
value of ecosystems is not fixed, and benefits depend on timing and location of ecosystem 
service delivery, on the relationship between water quality and quantity, on other ecosys-
tem services related to water and finally on stakeholders’ preferences’ (Schaafsma et  al. 
2015).
It is practical to ask whether or not there is a strong potential for tail risk, indicating a 
highly skewed distribution. How likely would the restoration or repair of a severely dam-
aged ecosystem service be rendered meaningless? An exorbitant hedge arising from an 
expectation of a massive shift in the temporal or locational regime of an ecosystem service 
may cause an upheaval in stakeholder preferences. The ‘tipping point’ could have been 
reached, and going back may cause unreasonably high costs. For example, Ranganathan 
et al. (2008) show that the collapse of a fishery could threaten livelihoods or cause conflict. 
In other words, there is a need to be sensitive to situations in which a natural sentiment for 
‘staying on’ could dominate a logical inclination for ‘moving on’.
4  Governance considerations in optimising transboundary watercourse 
treaty regimes
So far, this paper has explored how certain economic concepts and tools might advance 
transboundary water cooperation. This has included an analysis of property rights and the 
concept of perfect contracts. The paper has also explored ecosystem services and natural 
capital as a basis by which to view transboundary watercourses and their associated ben-
efits as assets. This has led to a discussion of how such assets might be incorporated into a 
portfolio of assets that might be managed between states. Challenges in applying these eco-
nomic concepts and tools have been discussed throughout the previous sections. However, 
one key challenge that is worthy of separate attention relates to the underpinning legal and 
institutional framework that might support any system of portfolio optimisation of trans-
boundary watercourse assets. Conversely, ensuring that an adequate legal and institutional 
framework is in place is fundamental to addressing some of the key challenges that have 
previously been identified, such as lack of information, uncertainty, coercion, power asym-
metry, valuations, and high transaction costs.
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Prior to considering design features relating to legal and institutional frameworks for 
transboundary water cooperation, it is important to provide some context. The current 
environment for transboundary water cooperation can best be described as fragmented 
(Zawahri and Mitchell 2011). This poses a major challenge in ensuring that appropri-
ate legal and institutional frameworks are in place to foster market-based approaches 
to transboundary cooperation. Traditionally, there has been a disconnection between 
geophysical and political watercourse boundaries. More than half of the world’s trans-
boundary watercourses lack a cooperative framework, and among those that have agree-
ments, approximately two-thirds do not include all basin states and/or fail to establish 
a complete set of rules and principles for the equitable and sustainable management 
of transboundary waters (UN-Water 2008). Moreover, while stakeholder voices and the 
national discourse on cooperation are crucial to decision-making and affect the likeli-
hood of cooperation, there is often a disconnection between national and transbound-
ary decision-making processes (Subramanian et al. 2014). While an analysis of different 
national jurisdictions is beyond the scope of the paper, it is important to recognise here 
that transboundary water cooperation is also contingent on effective alignment between 
national and transboundary governance levels.
Regardless of these challenges, states sharing a transboundary watercourse inevitably 
have to contend with the highly sensitive issue of allocating a finite resource. In some 
cases, this has resulted in a ‘tragedy of the commons’ scenario whereby states unilaterally 
seek to get the most out of shared natural resources while minimising the costs of exploi-
tation (Hardin 1968). However, others have maintained that such a tragedy of the com-
mons is not inevitable (Ostrom 1990). Benvenisti (2002) maintains that ‘with transbound-
ary resources such as ecosystems, which are international common pool resources, there is 
a palpable potential for collective action between the co-owner states that will provide an 
optimal and sustainable use of the resource’.
The foundations for fostering collective action within international law already exist. 
The cornerstone principle addressing cooperation over international watercourse stipulates 
that states ‘shall in their respective territories utilise an international watercourse in an 
equitable and reasonable manner’ (Art. 5, UN Watercourses Convention). When determin-
ing what is equitable and reasonable, states are encouraged to take all relevant factors and 
circumstances into account, with a view to attaining ‘optimal and sustainable utilisation 
thereof and benefits therefrom’ (Art. 5 and 6, UN Watercourses Convention). Relevant fac-
tors include the physical characteristics of the watercourses (e.g. geographic, hydrographic, 
hydrological, climatic, and ecological); the social and economic needs of the watercourse 
states and their populations; the effects of existing or potential uses of the watercourse; the 
need to protect ecosystems; and the availability of alternative uses of comparable value to 
existing or planned uses.
While international law does not go as far as stipulating how these factors or circum-
stances should be weighed against each other, the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilisation provides the legal foundations by which to support the portfolio optimisation 
of transboundary watercourse assets. Firstly, in taking into account all relevant factors and 
circumstances through an ecosystem services lens, it may be possible to more accurately 
identify the benefits derived from transboundary watercourse assets, as well as some of the 
services that have been traditionally undervalued. The relevant factors or circumstances 
are reflected or revealed in the process of optimising the portfolio of transboundary water-
course assets. Secondly, the aim of equitable and reasonable utilisation is to ‘provide the 
maximum benefit to each basin state from the uses of the waters with the minimum detri-
ment to each’ (ILA 1996). Trading watercourse assets, as discussed above, offers one way 
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by which such benefits might be maximised. The trading or transformation of ecosystem 
products reveals their opportunity costs to riparians.
In principle, the portfolio optimisation of transboundary watercourse assets may pro-
vide a promising means by which states cooperate. However, some notable challenges 
must be taken into account. Firstly, the nature of transboundary ‘problems’ are likely to 
influence whether or not states enter into cooperative arrangements (Underdal 2002). 
There is a higher likelihood of cooperation if the states see some gain in such cooperation. 
Cooperation between Canada and the USA on the Columbia River system, as illustrated 
above, offers one such example. Other situations may not be so conducive to cooperation 
(Schmeier 2013). Where activities in one state cause harm another, it may be difficult to 
encourage states to establish a cooperative framework which fully accounts for such exter-
nalities. This may especially be the case where there are power asymmetries between states 
(Zeitoun and Warner 2006). However, one positive example of cooperation in such a sce-
nario is the case between France and the Netherlands concerning the Mines de Postasse 
d’Alsace. In this case, the discharge of waste salts from a French state-owned potassium 
mine caused chloride pollution in the Netherlands. The Rhine states in 1986 were able 
to reach an agreement which called for the progressive reduction in chloride levels in the 
Rhine. Costs associated with pollution reduction were shared between France and Ger-
many (30% each), the Netherlands (40%), and Switzerland (6%). It should be noted, how-
ever, that such a cost sharing arrangement is at variance with the polluter-pays principle 
and rather ‘reflects economic reality more than principle or law’ (McCaffrey 2003). One 
reason for this is that the polluter-pays principle ‘remains open to interpretation, particu-
larly in relation to the nature and extent of the costs included and the circumstances in 
which the principle will, perhaps exceptionally, not apply’ (Sands and Peel 2012).
Strategies for fostering cooperation between states where transboundary externalities 
are evident might therefore need to rely on more than just customary international law 
principles. Side payments, either between riparian states themselves or through third-
party intervention, have been identified as one way to induce such cooperation (Dinar et al. 
2007). An example of such a cooperative arrangement can be seen in the Protection of 
the Orange–Senqu water sources (‘SPONGE’) project in Lesotho, where donor funding 
was used to improve land-use practices in upper part of the Orange–Senqu River (GOPA 
2016). In so doing, the project had the objective of holistic protection and conservation of 
the ‘sponges’ in the Khubelu catchment with a view to ‘securing long-term availability and 
quality of water from the Upper Orange-Senqu catchment area’. The project, in turn, brings 
benefits to downstream states on the Orange–Senqu River, namely South Africa, Namibia, 
and Botswana. In other words, side payments, supporting compliance with international 
agreements without weakening existing sanctions, change the payoffs and help bring about 
efficient solutions.
While more fully accounting for the hidden or undervalued ecosystem services may be 
an advantageous way by which to ascertain the relevant factors and circumstances, asym-
metric relationships between states may also come into play. States may feel that ecosystem 
services which upstream catchment areas provide, such as natural storage or flood preven-
tion, are something for which downstream states should pay. If downstream states have tra-
ditionally benefitted from such services without paying, then changing that dynamic may 
prove challenging. This may especially be the case where downstream states are classified 
as ‘hydro-hegemons’ (Zeitoun and Warner 2006). As we discuss above, third-party side 
payments might be one option to foster cooperation in such a wider benefit which could be 
derived from such cooperation—e.g. mitigation of likely impacts from climate change—
may also provide an incentive for states to cooperate. Moreover, such cooperation would be 
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underpinned by the customary international law obligation placed upon states to cooperate 
in good faith over international watercourses (Leb 2015).
Some efforts have been made to advance PES schemes at a transboundary level within 
existing governance settings. Under the UNECE Water Convention, Recommendations 
on Payments for Ecosystem Services in Integrated Water Resources Management were 
adopted in 2006. These recommendations provide guidance on the establishment of PES 
schemes, as well as examples of schemes which have been adopted within the UNECE 
region. While project-specific application remains limited, the UNECE example demon-
strates the willingness of states to explore market-based approaches to transboundary water 
cooperation. This willingness is also reflected in the significant number of soft law instru-
ments which call upon states and others to advance progress in the valuation of ecosystem 
services and explore innovative means for financing ecosystem protection.2
What remains to be done is to design treaties which optimally reflect the concepts of 
portfolio optimisation and commodity trading of transboundary watercourse assets. This 
is a huge challenge. While significant advances have been made, the process by which to 
identify and value ecosystem services is still subject to much debate over definitions, meas-
urement techniques, boundaries, scales, societal values, trade-offs, non-market good, and 
uncertainties about the link between biological diversity itself and the services that flow 
from ecosystems (Cook and Spray 2012; Norgaard 2010). Moreover, within a transbound-
ary context, it will be important that there are adequate mechanisms in place by which 
states regularly exchange data and information.
Many transboundary watercourse treaties include provision on the exchange and infor-
mation (Allan 2012; Gerlak et  al. 2011). While these treaties do not mention ecosystem 
services, they might offer the foundations by which to undertake any ecosystem services 
mapping and valuation exercise. Joint institutions must also play a role in the gathering of 
data and information, as well as in managing trade-offs between different users and inter-
ests. However, existing institutions tend to be too narrow in their focus. Irwin and Ranga-
nathan (2007), for example, suggest that:
Today’s institutions … usually focus on a single sector such as forestry or finance at a 
single political level or geographical scale and often on a short timeframe. A commu-
nity group or social network is concerned about local livelihoods, a national agency 
about planning national development, and a secretariat of an international conven-
tion about improving the state of specific types of resources such as biodiversity, 
migratory species, or wetlands globally. At every level, institutions are handicapped 
by their limited mandate, capacity or incentive to cooperate across geographical or 
political boundaries, or to consider the longer timeframes often needed to manage 
ecosystem services effectively. If ecosystem services are to be sustained to support 
human well-being, decision makers need to address drivers and effects of change that 
emerge at different levels and time scales. This will require working outside of tradi-
tional boundaries in multidisciplinary settlings.
2 See, for example, 4th Ministerial Conference on Protection of Forests in Europe, Vienna, 28–30 April 
2003; Statement of the Ministerial Meeting on Forests, Rome, 14 March 2005; 13th Session on Water, San-
itation and Human Settlements, New York, 11–22 April 2015, Resolution IX 3–4 of the 9th Meeting of the 
Conference of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Wetlands, Kampala, 8–15 November 2015, the 
2006 International Tropical Timber Agreement, and the 6th session of the UN Forum on Forests, 13–24 
February 2006; and Decisions VIII/9 and 17 of the 8th Ordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties 
to the convention on Biological Diversity, Curitiba, Brazil, 20–31 March 2006).
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Adopting a holistic approach within the context of transboundary watercourses is not 
straightforward. The Millennium Assessment (Hassan et al. 2005), for instance, recognised 
that:
…the water cycle plays so many roles in the climate, chemistry, and biology of Earth, 
it is difficult to define it as a distinctly supporting, regulating, or provisioning service. 
Precipitation falling as rain or snow is the ultimate source of water supporting eco-
systems. Ecosystems, in turn, control the character of renewable freshwater resources 
for human well-being by regulating how precipitation is partitioned into evaporative, 
recharge, and runoff processes. Together with energy and nutrients, water is arguably 
the centre piece of the delivery of ecosystem services to humankind.
Recognition of water’s central role in sustaining ecosystem services has led to repeated 
calls for a river basin approach to water resources management (UN 1992). At the polit-
ical level, a notable step forward is the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals 
which, under Goal 6.5, requires the international community to implement integrated water 
resources management at all levels, including through transboundary cooperation as appro-
priate (UNDESA 2016).
Further recognition of the need to establish legal and institutional arrangements is evi-
dent from the adoption and eventual entry into force of the Convention on the Law of the 
Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses in 2014 (UN 1997; Rieu-Clarke and 
Loures 2013), and the ‘global opening’ of the Convention on the Use and Protection of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (UNECE 1992), which means that 
all States across the world may now become parties to the Convention. National govern-
ments are also increasingly recognising the importance of adopting legal and institutional 
frameworks to address challenges of water scarcity, climate variability, and security (Rieu-
Clarke et al. 2012; US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 2011).
A further challenge relates to the engagement of stakeholders at multiple levels in trans-
boundary water cooperation. As noted previously, engagement of stakeholders beyond 
national governments is fundamental to the effective valuation of ecosystem services 
and any trade-offs between services and bundles of services. The Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (Hassan et al. 2005), for instance, observes that:
…a key focus for improving participatory processes is to help level the playing field 
through measures to increase the transparency of information; improve the repre-
sentation of marginalised stakeholders; engage them upfront in the establishment of 
policy objectives and priorities for the allocation of freshwater services, with which 
specific project should be consistent; and create a space for deliberation and learning 
that accommodates multiple perspectives.
While the challenges of participation have been documented elsewhere (Rieu-Clarke 
2010), it is important here to focus specifically on transboundary considerations. In this 
regard, Bruch et al. (2005) comment that ‘people often have little or no opportunity to par-
ticipate in watershed decisions that affect them, particularly when they live along interna-
tional watercourses’. There has, however, been a growing recognition of the need to engage 
stakeholders within transboundary decision-making structures (Tignino and Sangbana 
2015). Some treaty arrangements provide specific rights for non-state actors. The 1992 
UNECE Water Convention, for example, requires that ‘information concerning the condi-
tions of transboundary waters, measures taken or planned to be taken to prevent, control 
and reduce transboundary impact, and the effectives of those measures, is made available 
to the public’. Under the EU Water Framework Directive, the public are to be given access 
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to data and information relating to the development of river basin management plans, and 
member states are encouraged to ensure the active involvement of all interested parties in 
the implementation of the Directive. A suite of law relating to human rights also supports 
the participation of non-state actors in transboundary decision-making processes (see, for 
example, the UNECE Aarhus Convention).
While the above discussion only provides a snapshot of the governance considerations 
that should be taken into account when seeking to optimise transboundary water treaty 
regimes, a number of important points can be observed. Firstly, the founding principle of 
international water law, equitable and reasonable utilisation, provides the foundation by 
which an ecosystem services approach to valuation might apply at the transboundary level. 
Secondly, there is growing momentum in support of valuing ecosystem services, includ-
ing some embryonic initiatives at the transboundary level. Thirdly, both the challenges and 
importance of joint institutional arrangements have been highlighted. Lastly, the need to 
enhance the role of non-state actors in transboundary decision-making constitutes a key 
challenge and opportunity.
5  Conclusion
The first principles of law and economics support the design of legal or institutional 
arrangements facilitating a market-based approach to the discovery and allocation of eco-
system services among riparians. Potentially, a system of portfolio optimisation and com-
modity trading can be embedded within a transboundary treaty regime. There seems to 
be adequate foundations for fostering collective action within the law of international 
watercourses along such a basis, and advances in knowledge and understanding relating 
to ecosystem services also provide an important foundation for market-based approaches. 
Moreover, various soft law instruments reflect a political will to implement a system of 
portfolio optimisation and commodity trading for transboundary watercourse assets. While 
this paper has recognised that notable challenges exist, it has also shown that the potential 
is there and more should be done to study how market-based approaches might be applied 
to transboundary watercourse treaty regimes.
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